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1. Introduction
The trade policy agenda in Pacific Island Countries (PICs) has certainly become crowded, as the 
cast of players involved in regional trade politics and negotiations has become larger. In fact it 
is commonplace around the world that players such as commercial firms, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and international bodies like the World Trade Organization (WTO) are 
becoming actively involved in trade negotiations at the regional level. Consequently apart from 
the state, other voices are exerting attention-grabbing influence in the conduct of regional trade 
politics. While firms have always played an important role, the rise of NGOs proclaiming that 
they are acting in the interests of society presents an additional challenge in the move towards a 
more liberal trading system. The demonstrations by NGOs at the WTO Ministerial Conferences in 
Singapore (1996), Geneva (1998) and the US (1999) are well known. It is also well known that such 
huge interest from NGOs led the then Director-General of WTO, Renato Ruggiero, to announce 
an enhanced plan for cooperation with NGOs (WTO, 1998). 
Penjueli and Morgan (2010) argue that a regional trade agreement of PICs such as the Pacific 
Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus would not meet the needs of the PICs 
and that such an agreement would displace ‘. . . domestic production and imports from other 
countries and [add] further to the considerable trade imbalances [of] many Pacific countries’ (p. 
219). The authors of this article represent the Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG), a Suva 
based NGO. The article is in fact a response to an earlier article by Kaufmann (2009) justifying 
the benefits to PICs of signing PACER Plus with Australia and New Zealand. The crux of the 
argument by Penjueli and Morgan (2010) rests on the basic idea that a preferential trade agreement 
(PTA) like PACER Plus would not meet the needs of the PICs.
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In this paper we argue that the lines of reasoning both Kaufmann (2009) and Penjueli and Morgan 
(2010) have used are flawed. The paper disagrees with Kaufmann (2009) that an agreement with 
Australia and New Zealand will bring maximum benefits to PICs and questions the basic issue raised 
by Penjueli and Morgan (2010) and PANG. From the publications of PANG it is unclear whether it 
supports unilateral trade liberalisation, although its opposition to a regional trade agreement among 
PICs and Australia and New Zealand is obvious. While we agree with the opposition to such a trade 
agreement, the reasons PANG argues cannot go unchallenged. Such reasons could prove to be 
seriously detrimental if carried over to challenge unilateral liberalisation, which seems most likely to 
be the case for opponents of free trade. Most of the arguments raised by PANG wrap themselves up 
in the language of job preservation, national sovereignty and infant industries. It seems that PANG 
and law professor Jane Kelsey, the key author of its various reports (2004a and 2004b) ignore the 
logic of the economic case for free trade and as a consequence, end up revealing the old and now 
discarded mercantilist rules. 
2. The idea of a preferential trade agreement (PTA) for PICs
PTAs are once again fashionable. The first wave of PTAs started in the 1950s and 1960s; the 
last decade has witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of agreements. Although WTO is non-
discriminatory with respect to the application of trade policy in goods, services and intellectual 
property, both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor WTO allowed 
preferential or regional trade agreements among a division of members. Thus many countries agreed 
to commitments on a regional basis as well as multilaterally. Since 1948, more than 400 PTAs have 
been notified to the GATT or WTO, of which 227 are currently in force (as at December 2008). 
Among those in force, 143 were notified under GATT Article XXIV, 27 under the Enabling Clause, 
and 57 under GATT’s Article V (WTO, 2008).
It was natural for PICs – including Australia and New Zealand – to create trade agreements suited 
for the Oceania region. The creation of the South Pacific Bureau of Economic Cooperation in 
1971, and subsequently the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(SPARTECA) in 1981 between Australia, New Zealand and PICs marked the beginning of an era 
of regional collaboration in trade. It is also interesting that Australia and New Zealand saw the 
need to develop a closer and deeper economic integration. This came through the implementation 
of the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA). This 
agreement between Australia and New Zealand was essentially based on bringing down the tariff 
and non-tariff barriers (Scollay  et al., 2011). Later the formation of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG, comprising Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu within the PICs) 
Trade Agreement in 1993 signalled the changing attitude towards the importance and benefits of 
liberalisation. Regional cooperation was further developed in association with an urge to reduce trade 
barriers through the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), a free trade agreement 
formed in 2001 by the PICs. PICTA is still having difficulty, as some of the countries, notably 
the Republic of Marshall Islands and Palau, have not signed PICTA and the  Federated States of 
Micronesia has signed but not ratified. These countries’ lack of interest in PICTA is understandable; 
for historical reasons they are much closer to the USA and under the US Compact of Assistance 
scheme they receive significant benefits.
More recently, ongoing negotiations in PACER Plus (initially begun as PACER) and an economic 
partnership agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU) have generated extensive interest and 
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debate. The provisions in the EPA triggered the negotiations under PACER Plus when Fiji and 
Papua New Guinea signed interim EPAs, largely to ensure continued access to the EU market for 
their sugar and fish exports.
3. Preferential trade agreements: areas of concern
A country’s being part of a PTA may give an impression that it is actively involved in trade liberalisation. 
Yet such liberalisation may not be the best form of liberalisation for a country committed to 
reducing tariffs. The key problem with a PTA is that member countries remove tariffs on imports 
of their partners’ goods, but retain their own restrictions on imports from non-member countries. 
So the tendency to equate a PTA with free trade is erroneous (Viner, 1950; Panagariya, 1996). What 
exactly are the potential consequences of PTAs for PICs? There are several downsides. The rich 
theoretical and empirical literature in this area provides a compelling case against PTAs between an 
economically small region and the larger nations (Viner, 1950; Bhagwati, 1971, 1991, 1993; Baldwin 
& Venables, 1995; Bhagwati & Panagariya, 1996; Winters, 1996; Krishna, 1998; Panagariya, 1999, 
2000; and Bhagwati, 2008, among others). There are two sets of issues here; the first question deals 
with the static analysis effects while the second question is what Bhagwati (1991) has phrased as 
dynamic path questions or whether the PTAs can be regarded as ‘stumbling blocks’ or ‘building 
blocks’. In the case of the latter issue, while some researchers claim that these agreements can be 
important in moving towards global free trade, others have fiercely opposed regional agreements as 
a potential threat to the multilateral trading system. 
First is the issue of welfare analysis, where Viner (1950) pioneered research, especially in examining 
the static welfare analysis. Here, he showed that the net welfare effect depended on trade creation 
and trade diversion. In a more recent contribution in this area, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) 
conclude that PTAs are mostly welfare reducing because member countries may end up with severe 
losses, due to a substantial amount of trade diversion. The underlying argument against PTAs here 
is that they could divert trade from non-member countries who may be cost efficient to relatively 
inefficient member countries. When this happens, it disrupts the efficient allocation among countries. 
It is as simple as this; not all trade liberalisation is good. So it is perfectly possible that a country, 
having liberalised under a regional agreement such as PACER Plus, then experiences trade diversion, 
which harms it, instead of improving its gross national product. 
Later, Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Summers (1991) and others opposing Vinerian theory argued 
that if PTAs are formed by natural trading partners (this being defined as those having a high initial 
volume of trade among them), trade creation benefits will outweigh the trade diversion effects, 
allowing members to benefit. This view, however, has been disputed by Panagariya (1996) and 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996). They show that a high volume of initial trade can be a major loss to 
a member country, and the initial high volume, rather than being natural, may be due to preferences. 
In further support of RTAs , Krugman (1991) and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) have argued 
that small distance and thus, reduced transportation costs, should characterise beneficial natural 
trading partners. Bhagwati and Panagariya have also deemed this view to be incorrect (1996) as they 
show that a country is better off forming a PTA with a distant country rather than a regional or 
neighbouring country when these two countries are otherwise the same. Furthermore, the increase 
in the number of PTAs raises technical problems, particularly due to overlapping PTAs. One, when 
a country enters more than one PTA, a single commodity is subjected to different tariff rates due to 
different PTAs. Two, tariffs on commodities depend on where the product originated from, i.e. the 
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rules of origin. As countries sign multiple and crisscrossing PTAs, the trading system is likely to be 
chaotic. This prompted Jagdish Bhagwati to call this phenomenon the ‘spaghetti bowl’ problem. He 
aptly summarises the problems associated with this phenomenon in these terms (2008:69): 
The complexity that the spaghetti bowls create for international trade causes distortions 
in trade and investment. Much energy and resources must be expended to discover the 
optimal sourcing of large numbers of components with a view to minimizing the cost of 
manufacture plus transportation and the different tariffs and charges levied by origin.
Various issues such as different schedules for phasing out tariffs, different rules of origin, exclusions, 
conflicting standards and other regulations and policies are fundamental in the spaghetti bowl 
(Pangestu & Scollay, 2001; Menon, 2009). A sketch of the spaghetti bowl for the South Pacific 
(Oceania) region is shown in Figure 1. It includes only the PTAs within the Oceania region and with 
one another. 
Figure 1  Spaghetti bowl in Oceania
While Australia and New Zealand have their own PTAs with nations other than the Oceania region 
(for example, Australia–New Zealand; Australia–Chile; Australia–USA; Australia–Malaysia; New 
Zealand–Singapore; Australia–Singapore; Australia–Thailand; New Zealand–Thailand; Australia–
Papua New Guinea) PICs are negotiating for an EPA with the EU. Bhagwati (2008) has argued 
that PICs could be forced into signing this due to the loss in preferences granted and consequently 
market access provided by the EU until now. As the sketch shows, establishing which product is 
whose based on arbitrary rules of origin would be a muddled undertaking and impossible ambiguities 
will be numerous. Empirical research is needed to determine how big a problem the ‘spaghetti bowl’ 
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Secondly, is the issue of whether PTAs can be regarded as ‘stumbling blocks’ or ‘building blocks’. 
Are PTAs stepping stones for PICs to global free trade? Or should they be seen as a threat to the 
multilateral trading system? If PICs commit to PTAs such as those discussed in section 2, one 
may ask whether that will increase or decrease the process of reducing trade barriers toward the 
goal of reducing multilaterality. At the moment the answer to this question is not clear. PICs have 
undertaken or are currently negotiating a higher level of commitments on a regional basis than has 
been the case multilaterally. So it is evident that PICs’ attention and limited resources available to use 
in trade negotiations have been diverted towards PTAs rather than multilateral reforms. Only Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tonga are full members of the WTO. Most PICs are intent 
(for either economic and/or political reasons) on liberalising regionally rather than multilaterally as it 
seems trading of tariffs is an important aspect of trade liberalisation. It is also evident that PICs are 
less interested in WTO talks because they  want to keep tariffs to outsiders. The stalled Doha round 
may have also jeopardised this momentum. There is also a likelihood that formation of PTAs could 
lead to a rise in new interest groups opposing multilateral tariff reductions and effectively becoming 
long-term obstacles to multilateral liberalisation.
4. What remains of the case for protection?
Is there anything new under the sun for the proponents of protectionism? The simple answer is 
unequivocally, nothing. From time immemorial, we have come across a long list of protectionist 
arguments. Bhagwati’s initial contributions in the area of international trade show that these are 
mostly second-best arguments. The first-best arguments never involve protection and ample 
evidence exists that small countries will wither behind protective barriers (Dornbusch, 1992). While 
the theory of the costs of protection was mainly developed by Meade (1955), Corden (1957) and 
Johnson (1960), much has been refined since then. However, the core issues surrounding the costs 
have remained intact: misallocations in production and consumption and the prediction that heavily 
protected developing countries will continue to suffer disproportionately higher welfare losses. In 
any case protection has hardly enjoyed any intellectual respectability. For example, according to 
Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson (2005:243):
Economic history and best economic theory together persuade me that leaving or 
compromising free trade policies will most likely reduce future growth in well-being in both 
the advanced and less productive regions of the world. Protectionism breeds monopoly, 
crony capitalism and sloth. It does not achieve a happy and serene society.
Samuelson’s statement is indeed a reflection of the status of academic debate at this point in time. 
There is now general consensuses that open economies grow faster than closed economies (Romer; 
1986, Lucas, 1988 ; Romer, 1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Edwards, 1997). The reason for such 
a consensus in favour of trade liberalisation is based on the conclusions of a number of studies 
claiming that outward-oriented economies have performed better than inward-oriented countries 
in terms of economic growth (Dollar, 1992; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1998; Krueger, 1998; 
Vamvakidis, 1999; Frankel & Romer, 1999; Lee, Ricci & Rigobon, 2004; Dollar & Kraay, 2004). 
These studies represent key research within the large literature assessing the economic benefits of 
abandonment of import substitution strategy in pursuit of export promotion strategies. This change 
in outlook in trade policy gained momentum mainly in the 1970s due to the increasing criticisms 
levelled against import substitution industrialisation in influential works like Balassa (1971 ) and 
Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970). 
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5. What is the best option for PICs?
The benefits of liberalisation are now well documented in the literature. Dornbusch (1992) provides 
several channels through which trade liberalisation could bring benefits: improved resource allocation 
in line with social marginal costs and benefits; access to better technologies, inputs and intermediate 
goods; an economy better able to take advantage of economies of scale and scope; greater domestic 
consumption; and availability of favourable growth externalities, like the transfer of know-how; 
and a shake-up of industry that may create a Schumpeterian environment especially conducive to 
growth. Trade restrictions will end up restricting growth and produce a loss of real income. This 
will go on as long as the economy is protected. The argument that protection will protect jobs is an 
economic folly. While protection, in the short term, may help jobs in the protected industry more 
than would otherwise be the case, it does not mean that protectionist measures can increase the total 
volume of employment in the economy. In fact, it would be to the contrary. While job losses are 
likely from import competition, the solution to this is not trade restriction but other policies to help 
workers adjust.
Unilateral trade liberalisation is the first best form of liberalisation to free up trade and realise 
maximum gains. While it may be true that unilateral trade liberalisation could only occur if policy 
makers are convinced that such benefits outweigh the gains from preferential trade agreements, 
there still remains a powerful case for countries to pursue free trade regardless of what other 
countries may do. The intentions of PICs are clear. They want to liberalise but only regionally and 
that means free trade amongst them. This may be an indication of evidence that PICs   appreciate 
and understand the benefits of freeing up trade. So the sooner they are convinced that this can be 
achieved unilaterally and the serious downsides with PTAs, the better it will be for PICs . 
6. Concluding remarks
It has been known from the time of Adam Smith that the best way of reducing tariffs would be to 
do so unilaterally. However, from the perspective of political economy, we know this is not so easy. 
Special groups seeking protection will always be with us and thus will constitute a continuous source 
of new avenues of attack. This is true for the PICs as well. The well-known dispute between Fiji 
and Vanuatu on kava and biscuits was driven by powerful business interests. Attention appears to 
focus on the loss of tariff revenues in PICs while no consideration is given to the fact that increase 
in trade flows would increase revenue from taxes on sales and increase in income taxes due to higher 
consumption as a result of lower prices of tradables . It is true that those tariffs have helped create 
a source of revenues, and changes in trade policies have contributed to the concerns, but this is at 
most a transitional issue. Trade liberalisation is not an end in itself. It is thus critically important to 
consider what PICs are losing in the long term as a result of protection. 
PTAs, on the other hand, have had major implications for a rules based multilateral trading system. 
It is now becoming clear that in order to maximise social welfare, liberalisation based on preferential 
trade is certainly not the first best form of liberalisation. A successful conclusion of the Doha Round 
of the WTO could go a long way in enticing PICs in this area. In fact, developing countries such as 
PICs could be worse off under a complex system of overlapping PTAs. Existence of other PTAs 
by Australia and New Zealand with countries outside the region and the possibility of similar new 
ones would lead to a situation where weak PIC economies can easily be marginalised. Also, the 
possibility of gains from major trading partners would be eliminated under such a scenario due to 
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costly trade and investment diversion. Consequently non-discriminatory trade and gradual unilateral 
liberalisation remains the best option for PICs in order to maximise welfare. 
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